The next talk of our seminar series will be given by Eric Pacuit (University of Maryland) via Teams (please, see details below) on Monday, March 4h, starting from 12:30 (Milan time). Here it is the title and the abstract of his talk:
Title: From paradox to principles: Splitting cycles and breaking ties
Abstract: Voting on two alternatives appears unproblematic compared to voting on three (or more). When faced with only two alternatives, many arguments show that Majority Rule distinguishes itself from all other ways of making a group decision. For three or more alternatives, one faces the so-called “Paradox of Voting”: there may be elections with a *majority cycle* in which a majority of voters prefer $A$ to $B$, a majority of voters prefer $B$ to $C$, and a majority of voters prefer $C$ to $A$. In this talk, I will explain a series of results that axiomatically characterize rules for resolving majority cycles in elections. These rules avoid the “Strong No Show Paradox” by responding properly to the addition of new voters to an election and mitigate *spoiler effects* by responding properly to the addition of new candidates to an election.
This talk is based on joint work with Wes Holliday.
